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FTC v WHOLE FOODS MARKET:
A NEw FTC PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD?
Jessica Fricke*
The splintered panel opinions will create enormous uncertainty, de-
bate, and litigation over the meaning and effect of this decision.
And to the extent common principles and holdings are derived from
the opinions of Judge Brown and Judge Tatel, those principles will
authorize the FTC to obtain preliminary injunctions and block
mergers based on a watered-down preliminary injunction standard
and without sufficient regard for the economic principles that have
undergirded modern antitrust law.1
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the classic dichotomies of antitrust law is the analysis of firm
behavior through the balancing of efficiencies against potential harm
to consumers. In the instance of mergers, this balance can be a theo-
retically difficult one. Unlike aspects of antitrust law that are deemed
inherently unlawful and anticompetitive, mergers almost always pro-
duce a more efficient end product. In today's global economy, it
seems as though firms are forced to become large and efficient in or-
der to stay competitive with their rivals. This is often the cry of merg-
ing firms looking to overcome a governmental antitrust challenge.
The question of focus for antitrust analysis in the merger context, both
by judges and governmental enforcement agencies, is whether this end
product is one that has the potential to use its size and power to harm
consumer welfare.
What makes merger law even more complex is that this question is
one that does not have the luxury of hindsight. Mergers are unique in
that neither party has the benefit of concrete evidence; the cases are
essentially based on prospective material. How will the new market
concentration effect consumers? What product will the new market
concentration consist of? Will the quantity sold of the product de-
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 2010; B.A., Economics & Political Science, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 2007.
1. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
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crease? Will the prices of the goods at issue increase? Merger cases
do not have the benefit of observing these consequences in the
marketplace.
Moreover, the costs of a false negative by a court can be devastat-
ing. Once a merger is complete, the cost of unraveling the new firm
may be billions, and it may be difficult to fully restore competition in
the new market. Can it then be said that the consumer is effectively
harmed through this "remedial" measure? In another view, are attor-
ney fees simply too costly for a firm to legitimately compete against a
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") or Department of Justice
("DOJ") challenge? Does this cost deter parent corporations from
litigating viable defenses and ultimately merging into a more efficient
firm altogether?
On the other side, presumptuous intervention by the courts can
have a chilling effect on mergers. Due to the "tenuous nature of
merger agreements, the granting of a preliminary injunction effec-
tively kills the deal."2 In fact, "no firm has continued to litigate a
merger against the FTC after losing the preliminary injunction motion
and its appeal."3
Due to the costs associated with erroneous court decisions, both in
favor and against the merging corporations, the federal government
has placed substantial procedural hurdles in the way of these compa-
nies that are looking to merge. Firms may face challenges by one of
the two federal administrative agencies vested with antitrust enforce-
ment power, the FTC and the DOJ,4 both of which have overlapping
jurisdiction, however, as this Note will discuss, also have subtle yet
important differentiations in legal standards.
The FTC v Whole Foods5 merger case is a modern example of the
abovementioned difficulties that courts are faced with when predict-
ing the effects of a merger. What makes this case even more unique is
2. Thomas A. Lambert, Four Lessons from the Whole Foods Case: The Antitrust Analysis of
Mergers Should be Reconsidered 29 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 2008-22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1121789#.
3. Robert C. Jones & Aimee E. DeFilippo, FTC Hospital Merger Challenges: Is a "Fast-Track"
Administrative Trial the Answer To the FTC's Federal Court Woes?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE,
December 2008, at 4-5, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/12/Dec08-Jonesl2-22F.pdf.
4. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, at 129 (2007), availa-
ble at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/report-recommendation/chapter2.pdf. "[I]n addition to
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), fifty states and the District of Columbia are authorized to enforce federal antitrust laws
as parens patriae, including in instances where the federal enforcers might have chosen not to
challenge a transaction or conduct." Id at 127.
5. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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the fact that the merger between the two companies had already con-
summated prior to an appellate court ruling that the merger may be
illegal.6 Thereby, the Whole Foods case is also illustrative of the eco-
nomic costs of an erroneous court decision.
This Case Note will argue that the U.S. Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit") was wrong to overturn the district
court's analysis in Whole Foods. The D.C. Circuit announced a more
lenient standard of review for the FTC's request for a preliminary in-
junction.7 This new standard is not only doctrinally incorrect, in that
it does not adhere to Supreme Court precedent, but it may also have
adverse consequences in the marketplace. Similarly, the fact that the
FTC standard of review differs from that of the DOJ makes Whole
Foods a perfect illustration of the flaws in our dual enforcement sys-
tem. Finally, the D.C. Circuit also erred in not taking into considera-
tion the fact that the merger had already been consummated.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Governmental Authority to Prevent Mergers
Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act ("Clayton Act") prohibits
the merging of two corporations "where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the ef-
fect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly."" Both the FTC and the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the DOJ are vested with the power to enforce this statute. 9
The DOJ enforces Section 7 of the Clayton Act through civil actions,
whereas the FTC enforces the antitrust laws through Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act").10
Prior to the notice requirements enacted in 1976, these agencies
were forced to attack mergers that had already begun, which proved
to be a difficult task." In response to these difficulties, the Hart-
6. See id. at 1034.
7. See id. at 1041.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
9. See Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 129.
10. Id.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2640.
"[E]xperience has shown that after consummation occurs, many large mergers become almost
unchallengable. The government may well file suit, and ultimately win the subsequent litigation
on the merits of its Clayton Act case, by gaining a final judicial declaration of the merger's
illegality. Yet by the time it wins the victory - and the government is successful in the vast
majority of its litigated merger cases - it is often too late to enforce effectively the Clayton Act,
by gaining meaningful relief. During the course of the post-merger litigation, the acquired firm's
assets, technology, marketing systems, and trademarks are replaced, transferred, sold off, or
combined with those of the acquiring firm. Similarly, its personnel and management are shifted,
2010] 175
176 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Scott-Rodino Act was enacted by Congress to prevent the inefficien-
cies of post-consummation review, thereby attempting to decrease the
cost of antitrust enforcement for the courts, parties, and consumers in
general.12 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires that certain proposed
mergers be reported to the FTC and the DOJ for approval of consum-
mation.13 This filing requirement is necessary only for transactions
that meet a specific monetary threshold. 14 The threshold is measured
by the sales and assets involved in the transaction and the size of the
parties.15 Once the parties file with the correct agency, they must wait
thirty days before completing the merger. 16
During this thirty-day window of review, the federal agency in-
volved (either the FTC or the DOJ) has the authority to ask for a
"second request."17 The parties involved must then submit additional,
often more detailed, information and documents.18 This "second re-
quest" thereby extends the waiting period for an additional thirty days
after the requested documents have been submitted. 19
B. Preliminary Injunctions
Finally, after reviewing all of the available information, if the re-
viewing agency believes that the merger will violate antitrust laws, it
then has the statutory ability to file a request for injunctive relief in
the proper district court.20 However, the procedural posture of the
administrative course of action is dependent on which agency is deal-
ing with the anticipated merger. If the FTC is handling the matter, it
must file an administrative complaint after a district court has granted
its motion for a temporary restraining order.21 Through this com-
plaint, the FTC is initiating its own agency proceeding, which will ulti-
restrained, or simply discharged. In these ways, the acquiring and acquired firms are, in effect,
irreversibly 'scrambled' together. The independent identity of the acquired firm disappears. 'Un-
scrambling' the merger, and restoring the acquired firm to its former status as an independent
competitor is difficult at best, and frequently impossible." Id. at 2640-41.
12. See 15 U.S.C. §18(a).
13. Id.
14. See Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Revised Jurisdictional Thresh-
olds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/P859910sec7a.pdf (last vis-
ited March 31,2010).
15. FTC Premerger Notification Office, Introductory Guide I: What is the Premerger Notifica-
tion Program?, revised March 2009, at 2-3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/
guidel.pdf.
16. 15 U.S.C. ( 18(b)(1)(B).
17. FTC Premerger Notification Office, supra note 15, at 12.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id. at 13-14.
21. Id. at 14.
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mately determine the legality of the merger.22 In opposite, if the DOJ
is handling the matter, the case never leaves the district court; the
legality of the transaction is litigated and determined entirely by the
judiciary.23
The FTC has the authority to seek preliminary injunctions to stay a
potential merger under the authority of Section 13(b) of the FTC
Act.2 4 According to this statute, the court may only grant the tempo-
rary restraining order "[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the eq-
uities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate
success, such action would be in the public interest . . . ."25 The role
of the district court is unique in this instance; it does not have the
authority "to determine whether the antitrust laws have been or are
about to be violated. That adjudicatory function is vested in the FTC
in the first instance." 26 Instead, the district court must determine
whether the FTC's accusations are viable enough to stay the often
time sensitive merger, a transaction where millions of dollars may be
at stake.27
The congressional intent behind this legislation is to designate the
courts as an objective third party to act as a check on the authority of
the FTC.2 8 Accordingly, due to the administrative uniqueness of anti-
trust law and the powers that enforce it, the courts have determined
that the FTC has a lighter burden than that required by private liti-
gants under the traditional equity standard. 29 As the D.C. Circuit has
expressed, "the FTC does not have to prove . . . that the proposed
merger will in fact violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act because ' . . .
Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition'
. . . to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not
certainties.' "30
22. FTC Premerger Notification Office, supra note 15, at 14.
23. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006).
25. Id.
26. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting FTC v. Food Town
Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1342 (4th Cir. 1976).
27. See id. The district court must "consider the FTC's likelihood of success and weigh the
equities." Id.
28. FTC v Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1979).
29. FTC v Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "This standard is broader than
the traditional equity standard that is normally applicable to requests for injunctive relief and is
consistent with Congress' intention 'that injunctive relief be broadly available to the FTC."' Id.
(quoting FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1981))
30. Id. (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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C. Whole Foods Procedural Posture
At the beginning of 2007, Whole Foods announced it was looking to
enter into an agreement to purchase Wild Oats.31 At the time, Whole
Foods and Wild Oats were the first and second "largest supermarket
chain[s] focusing on natural and organic products in the United
States," 32 with Whole Foods operating 194 grocery stores and Wild
Oats operating 110.33 Accordingly, the two food market stores fol-
lowed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act protocol for their $565 million
merger.34 This entire pre-merger notification process lasted approxi-
mately four months.35
On June 6, 2007, the FTC filed a Complaint for Temporary Re-
straining Order and Preliminary Injunction in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia ("D.C. District Court") alleging a poten-
tial violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act by Whole Foods.36 In its
complaint, the FTC alleged that the merger of Whole Foods and Wild
Oats would substantially lessen competition in the operation of what
it labeled the product market of "premium natural and organic super-
markets" ("PNOS") in twenty-one geographic markets.37 Thereby,
the FTC argued that the merger would likely lead to higher prices,
reduced quality, and fewer choices for consumers.38
In August 2007, the D.C. District Court denied the FTC's request to
block the merger.39 The court concluded "[t]here [was] no substantial
likelihood that the FTC [could] prove its asserted product market and
thus no likelihood that it [could] prove that the proposed merger may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."40 In
coming to this determination, the district court, after a fact intensive
analysis, concluded that Whole Foods competed against all supermar-
kets and not just organic stores.41 The district court therefore rejected
the FTC's PNOS analysis and labeled the relevant market as all super-
31. Michael B. Bernstein & Deborah L. Feinstein, All Over the Map: Grocery Store Enforce-
ment from Von's to Whole Foods, 22 ANTITRUST 52, 55 (2007).
32. Id.
33. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007), rev'd 548 F.3d 1028
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 49-50.
41. Id. at 36.
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markets for the purpose of evaluating this merger.42 In the end, the
court concluded that the merger of Whole Foods and Wild Oats would
not substantially lessen competition in a market that included all su-
permarkets. 4 3 Ultimately, the district court stopped its analysis at the
product market definition determination, and "[b]elieving such a basic
failure doomed any chance of the FTC's success, the court denied the
preliminary injunction without considering the balance of the
equities." 44
After the decision, the FTC filed an emergency motion for an in-
junction pending appeal. 45 This motion was denied by the D.C. Cir-
cuit. 4 6 Subsequently, believing they were adhering to court approval,
on August 28, 2007, Whole Foods and Wild Oats consummated their
merger. 4 7 While effectuating the merger, parent company Whole
Foods spent an enormous amount of resources in its effort to almost
fully integrate the two brands.4 8 Whole Foods sold all of the stores
that had traded under the names "Sun Harvest" and "Henry's" and
spent millions of dollars and over 200,000 hours training Wild Oats's
personnel. 49
However, in the interim, the FTC filed for appeal.50 Sending shock
through the antitrust community, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's conclusions that the FTC showed no likelihood of success in an
eventual claim under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 1 This opinion will
be the topic of discussion throughout this note.
D. Status of Whole Foods Today
On March 6, 2009, the FTC announced a "settlement with Whole
Foods Market, Inc., that will substantially restore competition that
was eliminated by Whole Foods' 2007 acquisition of its closest rival,
Wild Oats Markets, Inc., and resolves agency charges that the acquisi-
42. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2007), rev'd 548 F.3d
1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
43. See id. at 49-50.
44. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
45. Id.
46. See Per Curiam Order, FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., No. 07-5276 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 23,
2007).
47. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. v. FTC, 1:08
CV 02121 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2008).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See FTC. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
51. See id.
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tion violated federal antitrust laws." 52 In exchange for the FTC drop-
ping its antitrust suit, Whole Foods agreed to sell thirty-two Wild Oats
stores.53 Of these thirty-two stores, only twelve were in operation at
the time of the settlement.54 Also, Whole Foods was required to relin-
quish the rights to the Wild Oats brand through the sale of the Wild
Oats trademarks and other intellectual property.55 A divestiture trus-
tee is to be responsible for this sale, which is to be completed within
six months from the date of settlement.56 If the stores are not sold
within six months from the date of settlement, the FTC may extend
the time limit to do so for another six months.57
III. SUBJECT OPINION
On July 19, 2008, the D.C. Court of Appeals, in what has become a
controversial opinion, reversed the district court's conclusions that the
FTC showed no likelihood of success in an eventual Section 7 claim
under the Clayton Act, and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.58 What makes this D.C. Court of Appeals decision unique is
that, although there was a majority decision to reverse the district
court's decision, there were three separate and distinct opinions re-
garding the correct analysis of the market definition and the standard
the FTC must meet for a preliminary injunction. 59 The D.C. Court of
Appeals issued an amended opinion on November 21, 2008, which in-
cluded Judge Tatel's opinion, concurring in the judgment, stating that
he agreed with Judge Brown's majority decision but disagreed with his
analysis.60 Although this amended concurrence is splintered, as Judge
Kavanaugh warned in his dissenting opinion, it will most likely consti-
tute binding precedent. 61
52. Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consent Order Settles Charges that Whole Foods' Ac-
quisition of Rival Wild Oats was Anticompetitive, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/whole-foods.
shtm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
53. Id.
54. Whole Foods Market, Financial Press Releases, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/com-
pany/press-releases.php (follow "Whole Foods Market and FTC Reach Settlement" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
55. Id.
56. FTC Consent Order, supra note 52.
57. Id.
58. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
59. See id.
60. Id. at 1041-42 (Tatel, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1061, n.8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). "Like the Supreme Court, this [D.C. Circuit]
Court has routinely recognized that a decision without a majority opinion usually still constitutes
a binding precedent." Id.
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A. Consensus between Judge Brown's and Judge Tatel's Opinions
Both Judge Brown and Judge Tatel used the same preliminary in-
junction standard by agreeing that "the FTC [would] usually be able
to obtain a preliminary injunction blocking a merger by 'rais[ing]
questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult[,] and
doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation.'" 6 2
They also agreed that once the FTC meets this standard, there be-
comes "' . . . a presumption in favor of preliminary injunctive relief,' 63
but the merging parties may rebut that presumption, requiring the
FTC to demonstrate a greater likelihood of success, by showing equi-
ties weighing in favor of the merger." 64
Perhaps most notably, the two judges agreed that the appellate
court still had jurisdiction over the matter, even though the parties
had consummated the merger.65 Judge Brown strongly expressed this:
"[o]nly in a rare case would we agree a transaction is truly irreversible,
for the courts are 'clothed with large discretion' to create remedies
'effective to redress [antitrust] violations and to restore competi-
tion." 66 Judge Brown noted that the court still had the power to pre-
serve the status quo through an injunction because there were still
viable remedies and an opportunity to "mitigat[e] the merger's alleged
harm to competition." 6 7 As applied to this case, Brown expressed that
an injunction could halt the complete integration of the two firms
even though Whole Foods had already sold some of Wild Oats's assets
to third parties.68 Similarly, Judge Brown made the point that if one
Wild Oats store could reopen and remain independent of Whole
Foods, then the FTC had the ability to remedy a Section 7 violation
under the Clayton Act, and for this reason, the case was not moot.6 9
62. Id. at 1035 (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (major-
ity opinion).
63. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Heinz, 246 F.3d at 726).
64. Id. (quoting FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
65. Id. at 1033-1034. See also id. at 1050.
66. Id. at 1033 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972)).
67. Id. at 1034.
68. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1034.
69. Id. "Moreover, the FTC is concerned about eighteen different local markets. If, as appears
to be the situation, it remains possible to reopen or preserve a Wild Oats store in just one of
those markets, such a result would at least give the FTC a chance to prevent a § 7 violation in
that market." Id.
2010] 181
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B. Judge Brown's Majority Opinion
Brown and Tatel's opinions then diverged at how the district court
erred in applying the standard for an injunction.70 According to Judge
Brown's opinion, "[d]espite some ambiguity, the district court applied
the correct legal standard to the FTC's request for a preliminary in-
junction."71 He reiterated that, "[i]n any case, a district court must
not require the FTC to prove the merits, because, in a [Section 13(b)
of the FTC Act] preliminary injunction proceeding, a court 'is not au-
thorized to determine whether the antitrust laws . . . are about to be
violated." 72 Brown, however, found error in the district court's fail-
ure to apply a sliding scale test.73 He emphasized that in order for the
district court to correctly apply the equity test and at the same time
remain consistent with the Section 13(b) standard under the FTC Act,
"this decision [not to apply the sliding scale test] must have rested on
a conviction the FTC entirely failed to show a likelihood of success." 74
Brown then stated that although the district court "acted reasonably
in focusing on the market definition,"75 it erred in its overall conclu-
sion by analyzing the product market incorrectly. 76 Specifically, the
district court had considered only "marginal consumers," those who
would switch from Whole Foods or Wild Oats to lower priced super-
markets once prices hit supracompetitive levels.77 However, Judge
Brown agreed with the FTC that, "in the high-quality perishables on
which both Whole Foods and Wild Oats made most of their money,
they competed directly with each other, and they competed with su-
permarkets only on the dry grocery items that were the fringes of their
business."78 With this determination, Brown concluded that these
types of stores cater to what the FTC calls a PNOS submarket, which
consists of a group of consumers who "have decided that natural and
organic is important, lifestyle of health and ecological sustainability is
important." 79
70. See id. at 1042 (Tatel, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 1034 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 1035 (quoting FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1342 (4th Cir. 1976)).
73. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 727 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1036.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1037.
78. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1040.
79. Id. at 1039 (quoting FTC v Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2007)).
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Brown also determined that "evidence of consumer behavior sup-
ported the conclusion that PNOS serve a core consumer base,"80 and,
therefore, the district court's determination "was an error of law, be-
cause in some situations core consumers, demanding exclusively a par-
ticular product or package of products, distinguish a submarket."81 To
Brown, this may be sufficient evidence to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion under his sliding scale analysis.82 He left the determination of
equities to the district court on remand.83
Judge Brown reached his ultimate conclusion that the FTC met its
preliminary injunction standard by emphasizing that the district court
ignored significant evidence.8 4 He stressed the FTC's evidence that
price margins for Whole Foods stores were depressed in cities that
also contained a Wild Oats store.85 He also pointed out the existence
of defendant's internal documents projecting that if a Wild Oats near
a Whole Foods closed then a majority of its customers would switch to
Whole Foods.8 6 Finally, the judge emphasized the market research
presented at trial, which "indicated [that] 68% of Whole Foods cus-
tomers are core customers who share the Whole Foods 'core
values.' "87
C. Judge Tatel's Concurring Opinion
Judge Tatel clarified in his opinion, using the same preliminary in-
junction standard as Brown, that in the D.C. Circuit, "the standard for
likelihood of success on the merits is met if the FTC 'has raised ques-
tions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful
as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, . . . .'
However, Tatel then diverged from Brown in the application of this
standard by focusing on the FTC's evidence and agreeing with the
Commission "that Whole Foods and Wild Oats are not 'reasonabl[y]
interchangeab[le]' with conventional supermarkets and do not com-
pete directly with them."89 Tatel also heavily relied on the incriminat-
ing emails sent by Whole Foods' CEO, John Mackey, suggesting that
80. Id. at 1040.
81. Id. at 1041.
82. Id.
83. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1041.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1040.
86. Id. at 1038.
87. Id. at 1040.
88. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1042 (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714-15 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (Tatel, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1043.
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184 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
the sole reason for the merger was to squash its competitor. 90 Judge
Tatel acknowledged that intent was not an element in assessing
whether a merger violates antitrust laws, but he noted that "evidence
indicating the purpose of the merging parties, where available, is an
aid in predicting the probable future conduct of the parties and thus
the probable effects of the merger." 91
D. Judge Kavanaugh's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kavanaugh was the only judge of the three to agree with the
district court's ruling.92 In a strong dissent, Kavanaugh noted the con-
tradictory nature that had been taken on by the D.C. Court of
Appeals:
Both a year ago and now, the same central question has been before
the Court in determining whether to approve an injunction: whether
the FTC demonstrated the necessary "likelihood of success" on its
§ 7 case. A year ago, the Court said no. Now, the Court says yes.
The now-merged entity, the industry, and consumers no doubt will
be confused by this apparent judicial about-face.93
Kavanaugh then reiterated the district court's conclusion that Whole
Foods is a competitor with all supermarkets, not just those that are in
the organic-only submarket. 94
Judge Kavanaugh most harshly criticized the majority's low prelimi-
nary injunction standard, as applied to the FTC.95 Kavanaugh
stressed that, "[e]ven at the preliminary injunction stage, the relevant
statutory text and precedents expressly require that the FTC show a
'likelihood of success on the merits."' 96 In Kavanaugh's words, the
correct preliminary injunction standard requires more of a showing
than Brown and Tatel's standard and is met "by establishing a likeli-
hood of success - namely, a likelihood that, among other things, the
merged entity would possess market power and could profitably im-
pose a significant and nontransitory price increase."97 Kavanaugh
provided a structural requirement to this standard by quoting Section
1.11 of the Horizontal Merger GuidelineS98 and noting that the FTC
90. Id. at 1049. Mackey stated in an email that Wild Oats was "the only existing company that
ha[d] the brand and number of stores to be a meaningful springboard for another player to get
into this space. Eliminating them means eliminating this threat forever, or almost forever." Id.
91. Id. at 1047.
92. See id. at 1051 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
93. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1051-52.
94. See id. at 1052.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
97. Id. at 1061.
98. Horizontal Merger Guidelines ( 1.11 (1997).
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''needs to make a sufficient showing that the merged company could
exercise market power and profitably impose a 'small but significant
and nontransitory increase in price."' 99
Kavanaugh also expressed that Brown and Tatel's new preliminary
injunction standard did not adhere to the Supreme Court's announce-
ment of this standard in Munaf v Geren.100 According to Kavanaugh,
in Munaf, "the Supreme Court unanimously rejected [the] lesser 'seri-
ous questions' standard as too weak and not equivalent to the 'likeli-
hood of success' necessary for a preliminary injunction to issue."101
Kavanaugh then noted that both Brown and Tatel approved "the
FTC's request for preliminary injunction without making the essential
'likelihood of success' finding that is required by the statutory text and
Supreme Court precedent." 102
Kavanaugh gave off the overall sense in his dissent that the majority
had delegated too much power and deference to the FTC by "water-
ing down the preliminary injunction standard." 103 He feared that
Brown's reading of the law would allow "the FTC to just snap its fin-
gers and temporarily block a merger." 10 4 Prior to Tatel's amended
concurrence, Kavanaugh believed that in diluting the FTC's require-
ments for a preliminary injunction, Judge Brown was "hint[ing] that
the FTC need not demonstrate a likelihood of success to obtain a pre-
liminary injunction in a [Section 7 Clayton Act] case."105 He feared
Brown's lax standard "would .. . enhance the FTC's power to torpedo
mergers well beyond what Congress has authorized."10 6
IV. ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit in Whole Foods107 was incorrect to reverse the dis-
trict court's decision to deny the FTC's request for a preliminary in-
junction in four separate respects. First, the D.C. Circuit was flawed
in its analysis when coming to its determination of a standard of re-
view for the preliminary injunction by failing to adhere to Supreme
Court precedent.108 Second, the appellate court's standard that the
99. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1052.
100. See id. at 1061.
101. Id. at 1061 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2219 (2008)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1052.
105. FTC v Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 533 F.3d 869, 893, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting), op. amended and superseded, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2008).
106. Id.
107. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt, Inc. 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (majority opinion).
108. See infra Section IV. A.
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FTC must meet to show that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction is
much too lax, which may cause ramifications for future antitrust cases
and firm behavior in the decision-making process of potentially merg-
ing firms.109 Third, the D.C. Circuit's analysis and procedural flaws
illustrate the problems of the United States' dual antitrust system as a
whole.110 Finally, the fact that the merger between Whole Foods and
Wild Oats had been consummated should have been taken into con-
sideration when the court of appeals reviewed the FTC's claim."'
A. Standard for Preliminary Injunction Does Not Follow Precedent
The standard used by the appellate majority in determining when
the FTC can secure a preliminary injunction to block a merger does
not follow its own precedent. In effect, the standard enunciated by
the court of appeals is too lax and may hinder economic growth and
viability.
Although the panel does make its own determination of relevant
market power, the opinion seems to suggest that proof of a relevant
market may not even be necessary.112 Notably, the D.C. Circuit ex-
pressed that it is not necessary for the FTC "to settle on a market
definition at this preliminary stage" because preliminary injunctions
sought by the agency "are meant to be readily available to preserve
the status quo while the FTC develops its ultimate case, . . . ."113
However, preserving the status quo in merger cases may effectively
mean ultimately holding in favor of the governmental agency.' 14
In the majority opinion, Judge Brown enunciates the correct struc-
ture for a Section 7 violation under the Clayton Act: "the framework
we have developed for a prima facie [Section 7] case rests on defining
a market and showing undue concentration in that market .. "
However, he goes on to seemingly imply that a showing below this
threshold may be enough to stay a merger via a preliminary injunc-
tion.116 He backtracks from the correct reading of the Section 7 re-
quirement when he says that "this analytical structure does not
exhaust the possible ways to prove a [Section 7] violation on the mer-
its, . . . much less the ways to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
109. See id.
110. See infra Section IV. B.
111. See infra Section IV. C.
112. See Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1036.
113. Id.
114. See Jones, supra note 3.
115. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1036 (quoting United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d
981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
116. See id.
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the merits on a preliminary proceeding."" 7 Judge Brown's standard
thereby does away with the requirement that the FTC show a "likeli-
hood of success on the merits," as required by FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co."8
1. Standard Does Not Follow Heinz/Baker Framework
This lax standard for a preliminary injunction, enunciated by Brown
and Tatel, incorrectly dilutes the standard used by the D.C. Circuit in
Heinz.119 In Heinz, the FTC sought a preliminary injunction pursuant
to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to enjoin the consummation of a
merger between two baby food producers.120 The Heinz court, when
determining the FTC's probability of success, used the Baker Hughes
analysis: "[f]irst the government must show that the merger would
produce 'a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and [would] result[ ] in a significant increase in the concentra-
tion of the firms in that market.'"121 Not only did the Heinz court
apply the Baker Hughes analysis, but the court applied it in detail
throughout a majority of its opinion, thereby emphasizing its
importance.122
The appellate panel seemed to write off this analysis by its sug-
gested abandonment of the "likelihood of success" test.123 Judge Kay-
anaugh stresseed in his dissent that Brown and Tatel incorrectly apply
Heinz because "Heinz only assumed [the] particular gloss on the 'like-
lihood of success on the merits' requirement for preliminary injunc-
tions based on a concession in the case." 124 Also, Kavanaugh noted
that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act "unambiguously requires that
courts consider 'the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success'
"125
117. Id. (citing United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 660 (1964)).
118. Id. at 1059 (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (Kava-
naugh, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 711. In Heinz, the FTC brought suit seeking to prevent the merger of
the second and third largest manufacturers of jarred baby food. Id.
121. Id. at 715 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)). "Al-
though Baker Hughes was decided at the merits stage as opposed to the preliminary injunctive
relief stage, we can nonetheless use its analytical approach in evaluating the Commission's show-
ing of likelihood of success." Id.
122. See id. at 715-24.
123. See FTC v Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 533 F.3d 869, 893, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting), op. amended and superseded, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2008).
124. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1059-60 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 1060. For a discussion on how Whole Foods diverges from the congressional intent
of the FTC Act, see Ilene K. Gotts, Joseph J. Simons, George T. Conway III & Aidan Synnott,
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2. Standard for Preliminary Injunction Is Too Lax
Not only does this newly announced preliminary injunction stan-
dard contradict precedent and statutory language, it also gives the
FTC too much deference, which may prove to have drastic effects in
the marketplace. As Judge Kavanaugh warned in his dissent, this ig-
norance of precedent combined with a lax standard for a preliminary
injunction may lead to the ability of the FTC to prohibit mergers at its
whim.126 In consequence, this new standard may effectively defeat the
purpose of judicial review under Section 13(c) of the FTC Act, seem-
ingly giving the FTC tacit approval without a thorough analysis.127
Although it is true that actual proof that a relevant market exists
will not be necessary until the case is adjudicated administratively by
the agency, in the meantime, the merger must be halted if the prelimi-
nary injunction passes judicial review. But this may prove too little too
late. This unfettered discretion given to the FTC will have harmful
effects on time-sensitive mergers. The primary purpose of preliminary
injunctions is to stay harmful effects of potentially illegal behavior in a
timely manner.128 This case is a perfect illustration of how this primary
purpose of a preliminary injunction is practically being eliminated.
Although the FTC and Whole Foods eventually settled, the review of
the injunction itself took over a year and was never finally determined
by the courts.129
Such a lax standard may have an even more significant effect on the
market through the deterrence of efficient mergers. "[G]iven the ten-
uous nature of merger agreements, the granting of a preliminary in-
junction effectively kills the deal."130 Statistics show that no firm has
chosen to continue to litigate a merger against the FTC after losing its
preliminary injunction motion.' 3 ' Today, investors may even be more
sensitive to the news of a motion for a preliminary injunction, causing
Recent DC Circuit decisions in Whole Foods leave standard for future mergers unsettled, COMPE-
TITION LAW INT'L, 12, 17-18 (Feb. 2009), http://www.paulweiss.com/files[Publication/ellafde3-7d
e6-479b-bOb8-5a43e25538c9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/03f09973-5fbf-463a-9cbb-bbO1
784d506bPWCLIFeb09.pdf.
126. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1052 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
127. See id.
128. See FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1344 (4th Cir. 1976). "The only pur-
pose of a proceeding under s 13 is to preserve the status quo until FTC can perform its function".
Id.
129. Id. at 1051. On July 29, 2008, the circuit court remanded back to the district court to
weight the equities, a question it had not addressed in its original opinion. Id. On March 6, 2009
the FTC and Whole Foods announced a settlement agreement, at that time the district court had
not yet made its final determination on the equities. See Per Curiam Order, supra note 46.
130. Lambert, supra note 2, at 29.
131. Jones, supra note 3.
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them to err on the side of risk aversion and deter them from pursuing
perfectly legal mergers.
On another note, the preliminary injunction standard is too low be-
cause it causes a divergence in the analysis for a final decision versus
the analysis for a preliminary injunction. As a practical matter, the
higher standard applied to permanent sanctions of mergers may cause
different results, although faced with the same set of facts. "For in-
stance, if the FTC brings a preliminary injunction motion under
[S]ection 13(b) of the FTC Act, it must effectively meet a public inter-
est test. But if it wants to permanently block a merger, it must prove
the substantive elements of [S]ection 7 of the Clayton Act, which it
seeks to do in an administrative hearing before the agency."132
The emphasis on the weight of the preliminary injunction hearing to
the entire livelihood of the merger also presents due process issues
when it comes to a lax standard for a preliminary injunction. "The
lower legal threshold for a preliminary injunction . . . raises the issue
of whether the FTC can provide the parties to an enjoined merger
with a practical opportunity to address the merits in the FTC's admin-
istrative process."' 33 Whole Foods is illustrative of this issue.134
Whole Foods litigated its preliminary injunction for almost two years;
however, the case came to a settlement prior to the real adjudication
of the case on its merits in an FTC agency administrative
proceeding. 135
B. Whole Foods Highlights the Flaws in Our
Dual-Enforcement System
The circuit court's decision in Whole Foods illustrates the discrepan-
cies between the FTC and the DOJ when it comes to their means of
preventing mergers and inhibiting competition. Specifically, the deci-
sion highlights the fact that the FTC's standard for review of a prelim-
inary injunction is more relaxed than the standard faced by the DOJ.
1. The Agencies and Their Different Procedural Courses
When faced with issues involving mergers, the DOJ and the FTC
differ procedurally. The FTC, as was done in the Whole Foods case,
uses the court system only to preserve the status quo through tools
132. Dany H. Assaf & Sarah K. McLean, It's Not Over Until It's Over: When is the Deal Really
Done?, 23 ANTrrRUST 59, 60 (2008).
133. Jones, supra note 3, at 7.
134. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (majority opinion).
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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such as judicial preliminary injunctions.136 Traditionally, the FTC's
administrative review of the merger is stayed until the determination
of the preliminary injunction by a federal court.'37 By nature, these
injunctions are temporary, not permanent (as compared to those in-
junctions sought by the DOJ).138 The FTC then adjudicates cases on
their merits through an administrative proceeding for a final determi-
nation.139 This method of adjudication can often be cumbersome and
time consuming to a firm faced with an FTC challenge.
On a similar note, if the FTC is unable to obtain a preliminary in-
junction in the federal court, the agency is still able to seek permanent
relief in administrative Part III proceedings.140 Therefore, although
the parties have the legal ability to consummate the proposed transac-
tion, "antitrust litigation may continue for the merged parties while
the FTC pursues permanent relief via Part III proceedings."141 This
could ultimately burden the merger because "[s]uch administrative lit-
igation can be lengthy, leaving a completed transaction in the limbo of
litigation for over a year."142
In contrast to the FTC, the DOJ, as a branch of the judiciary, has a
different procedural course for the way it handles firms looking to
merge. The adjudication process is more streamlined than that of the
FTC because the DOJ tries its merger cases in the same federal court
in which it has the ability to seek preliminary injunctive relief.143
Also, the DOJ is more efficient in that it normally "seeks a permanent
injunction (along with a preliminary injunction) against mergers it be-
lieves are anticompetitive, resolving the question fully and completely
in a single proceeding before a judge." 144 "If the DOJ fails to obtain
the permanent injunction it seeks, the parties can consummate the
merger without further antitrust litigation (assuming the DOJ does
136. See 15 U.S.C. 4 53(b).
137. Jones, supra note 3, at 5. "Given the magnitude of the preliminary injunction process and
the resources needed to litigate the motion, the FTC's administrative review traditionally has
been stayed until resolution of the 13(b) action." Id.
138. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 130.
139. See FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.72.
140. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 130. The FTC has the ability to
enforce Section 5 of the FTC Act through internal administrative litigation before an administra-
tive law judge, subject to review by the FTC Commissioners and a federal court of appeals.
These enforcements are referred to as "Part III proceedings." See id. at 129.
141. Id. at 130.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 130. "Generally, the DOJ agrees with the parties to combine (or consolidate) pro-
ceedings for both a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction in court (despite statutory
authorization to seek permanent relief in court as well)." Id. at 138.
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not appeal)." 145 Not only is the process streamlined, but there seems
to be an element of fairness in the fact that the final decision maker is
the same authority as the authority making the preliminary injunction
determination: the federal judge.
2. Preliminary Injunction Standard
The DOJ and the FTC have different adjudication procedures be-
cause of the root of their statutory authority. The FTC's authority to
seek a preliminary injunction comes from Section 13(b) of the FTC
Act. 14 6 As discussed at length above, this standard allows an injunc-
tion to be granted "[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equi-
ties and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success,
such action would be in the public interest . "147 Conversely, the
DOJ is entitled to seek preliminary injunctions under Section 15 of
the Clayton Act. 148 The statutory authority for the DOJ does not enu-
merate a specific preliminary injunction standard, unlike Section 13(b)
of the FTC Act does for the FTC.149 Therefore, courts normally hold
the DOJ to the common law standard to which private plaintiffs are
held.150 This standard typically requires a likelihood of success on the
merits.151 Therefore, even prior to the relaxing of a preliminary in-
junction by the Whole Foods case, the DOJ was faced with a lower
standard than the FTC. The Whole Foods standard simply enlarges
this discrepancy.
Also, as mentioned above, the DOJ tends to agree with the private
parties to consolidate their actions for preliminary and permanent in-
junctions.152 Therefore, as a practical matter, the DOJ more often
than not is required to show "that the proposed merger would violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act by a preponderance of the evidence." 153
This preponderance of the evidence standard is in even further con-
trast with the newly watered down standard announced by the D.C.
Circuit in Whole Foods.
145. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 130.
146. See 15 U.S.C. ( 53(b).
147. Id.
148. See 15 U.S.C. ( 15.
149. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 142.
150. Id. "[Courts generally apply a version of the traditional equity test, which does not
require the usual showing of irreparable injury. Some courts describe the proper test as
'whether the Government has shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and
whether the balance of equities tips in its favor."' Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 139.
153. Id.
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3. The Discrepancies and Their Effect on the Marketplace
These procedural differences may be detrimental to federal anti-
trust enforcement. As mentioned before, "this difference could mate-
rially affect the parties' prospects for completing their transaction"
due to the fact that cases typically hinge on the granting or dismissal
of a preliminary injunction.154 Because preliminary injunctions seem
to be very outcome determinative in the cases of time sensitive merg-
ers, this lighter burden held by the DOJ could make the ultimate out-
come of a merger challenge dependent upon which agency brings the
challenge as opposed to the merits of the case.' 5 5 These discrepancies
then may inevitably cause one agency to favor specific litigation over
the other, thereby causing artificially high enforcement by one
agency.156
Not only does this discrepancy seem inherently unjust, but it also
places undue procedural burdens on companies that are forced to ad-
here to different legal obligations. With multiple enforcers, firms con-
templating a merger are potentially subjected "to a range of different
legal obligations, thus either imposing substantial compliance costs or
compelling companies to follow the rules of the most restrictive juris-
diction." 157 Consequently, these additional costs are unavoidably
passed down to consumers. 58
The former Antitrust Modernization Commission 59 ("AMC") has
addressed its concern for this discrepancy. The AMC fears that this
inconsistency between the two agencies has the potential to "under-
mine the public's confidence that the antitrust agencies are reviewing
mergers efficiently and fairly .. ."160 Because the FTC has the ability
to adjudicate matters via administrative litigation after a preliminary
injunction, the AMC feels as though companies may take additional
precautions and this "may lead companies whose transactions are in-
vestigated by the FTC to feel greater pressure to settle a matter than if
154. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 139.
155. Id. at 130-31.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 127.
158. See id. As the Commission puts it, "[o]f course, antitrust compliance and enforcement
will always impose some costs on companies, regardless of the number of enforcers. It is impor-
tant, however, to ensure that those costs do not overwhelm the benefits of antitrust enforcement
or undermine consensus about the value of a strong antitrust enforcement regime." Id.
159. The Antitrust Modernization Commission terminated on May 31, 2007, pursuant to the
Antitrust Modernization Commission Act, as amended. Antitrust Modernization Commission,
http://govinfo library.unt.edulamc/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). The Antitrust Modern-
ization Commission submitted its Report and Recommendations to Congress and President
Bush on April 2, 2007. Id.
160. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 131.
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they had been investigated by the DOJ."161 However, "[r]egardless of
the degree of effect, these factors have led some knowledgeable prac-
titioners to believe that companies whose mergers are investigated by
the FTC are at a disadvantage as compared with those investigated by
the DOJ."162 Thereby, the AMC warns that firms may favor a charge
brought by the DOJ versus the FTC.163 The general fear is that the
American people could see two different results from two cases with
identical facts. This discrepancy in the agencies may thereby cause the
public to lose confidence in the enforcement system in general. The
AMC codified these concerns in its recommendation to Congress:
Congress should ensure that the same standard for the grant of a
preliminary injunction applies to both the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice by
amending Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
specify that, when the Federal Trade Commission seeks a prelimi-
nary injunction in a Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger case, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission is subject to the same standard for the grant
of a preliminary injunction as the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice.164
On a similar note, the AMC also recommended that the FTC adjudi-
cate matters in a similar fashion to the DOJ:
The Federal Trade Commission should adopt a policy that when it
seeks injunctive relief in Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger cases in
federal court, it will seek both preliminary and permanent injunc-
tive relief, and will seek to consolidate those proceedings so long as
it is able to reach agreement on an appropriate scheduling order
with the merging parties.165
Although revision of the specificity of the preliminary injunction
standard may only be done through congressional amendment, the
Whole Foods case is a perfect illustration of the concerns addressed by
the AMC. 1 6 6 The FTC should have been subjected to a higher stan-
dard for a preliminary injunction, similar to that faced by the DOJ.; if
the FTC had been subject to this review in the first place, the FTC
may have put on a stronger case in front of the district court, poten-
tially reducing the risk of this costly and time-consuming appeal.167
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 132.
165. Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 4, at 131.
166. See Lambert, supra note 2, at 29. "The Whole Foods case demonstrates the wisdom of
raising the standard of proof for injunctive relief." Id.
167. Id.
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The appellate court's decision may in fact spawn more aggressive
FTC behavior and cause the FTC to take on more merger cases.
Along with the AMC's fears that companies will favor a charge by the
DOJ, there also remains a concern that the FTC will pursue mergers
more aggressively in comparison to the DOJ due to their lower bur-
den of proof.168 This new standard may also cause premature prose-
cution; as forecasted by some practitioners, "the decision will likely
invigorate the FTC to challenge mergers before it has fully developed
its theories of competitive harm."169 It seems as though these ineffi-
cient and unjust consequences are those of which the AMC warned.
C. Fact That Merger Had Been Consummated Should Have Been
Taken Into Consideration
An important issue distinct from that of the FTC's standard for a
preliminary injunction is the reality of the court of appeals' failure to
take into consideration the fact that the merger between Whole Foods
and Wild Oats had already been consummated. The court remanded
the decision back to the district court for the precise determination of
a violation and remedial measures.170 However, the appellate court
seemed to brush off the fact that Whole Foods had spent millions of
dollars by beginning to effectuate the merger.
While on appeal, Whole Foods and Wild Oats, with what they be-
lieved to be express approval of their merger by the judiciary, began
to effectuate their merger.171 During the timeframe between the dis-
trict court decision and the D.C. Circuit decision, Whole Foods spent
an enormous amount of resources in an effort to begin the full inte-
gration of the two brands.172 As mentioned above, Whole Foods sold
all of the stores that had traded under the names "Sun Harvest" and
"Henry's" and spent millions of dollars and over 200,000 hours train-
ing Wild Oats's personnel. 173
However, Judge Brown only lightly discussed the issue of mootness
due to the consummation of the merger.174 He acknowledged that the
168. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
169. McDermott, Will & Emery, D.C. Circuit Reverses Decision Denying Preliminary Injunc-
tion in Whole Foods/Wild Oats Merger, McDermott Newsletters, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.mwe.
comlindex.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetaillobjectid/52c97533-794c-4cad-9aal-ff8fe9b5e.
cfm.
170. Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1041 (majority opinion).
171. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 47.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Whole Foods, 548 F. 3d at 1034.
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court had "no 'authority to command return to the status quo,' . . . in a
literal way by forcing absent parties to sell those assets back to Whole
Foods, but there is no reason to think that inability prevents [the
court] from mitigating the merger's alleged harm to competition." 175
With this acknowledgment of a lack of a concrete remedy for the as-
sets already sold, Judge Brown failed to specifically describe a plan as
to how the situation could be remedied.176
Even the FTC, in different merger cases, has stressed the difficulty
of "unscrambling" consummated mergers:
During the course of the post-merger litigation, the acquired firm's
assets, technology, marketing systems, and trademarks are replaced,
transferred, sold off, or combined with those of the acquiring firm.
Similarly, its personnel and management are shifted, retrained, or
simply discharged. In these ways, the acquiring and acquired firms
are, in effect, irreversibly "scrambled" together. The independent
identity of the acquired firm disappears. "Unscrambling" the
merger, and restoring the acquired firm to its former status as an
independent competitor is difficult at best, and frequently
impossible.177
In fact, there have been few modern antitrust cases that have dealt
with post-consummation mergers, due to the pre-merger review set up
by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.178 This oversight of the mootness issue
emphasizes the erroneous rationale of the court of appeals; the practi-
calities of the lawsuit seemed to have been overlooked. This failure to
take into consideration merger consummation, some scholars warn,
"may simply encourage either side to always appeal to judicial author-
175. Id. (quoting FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
176. See id. "As to the distribution facilities, neither party has described what they are, sug-
gested Wild Oats would not be a viable competitor without them, or explained why the district
court could not order some provisional substitute. Moreover, the FTC is concerned about eigh-
teen different local markets. If, as appears to be the situation, it remains possible to reopen or
preserve a Wild Oats store in just one of those markets, such a result would at least give the FTC
a chance to prevent a § 7 violation in that market." Id.
177. Complaint Counsel's Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Stay Discovery and All
Other Aspects of This Proceeding at 4, In re Inova Health Sys. Found. & Prince William Health
Sys., Inc., No. 9326 (FTC May 27, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9326/080527
ccopprespmostaydiscov.pdf (citing William J. Baer, Remarks Before the Conference Board
(Oct. 29, 1996), available at http://ftc.gov/speeches/other/hsrspeec.shtm).
178. "The federal enforcement agencies occasionally undertake post-consummation chal-
lenges, either with respect to transactions that were not reportable under the pre-merger notifi-
cation regime (perhaps because they were too small), or to mergers and acquisitions that my not
have appeared to present competitive problems at the time they were reported, but raise con-
cerns later." ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 433 (Thomp-
son West) (2nd Ed. 2008).
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ities because, after all, it appears almost any bell can now be
unrung."179
Although the fate of Whole Foods is unknown, the fruits of this
two-year battle ended with a consent decree between Whole Foods
and the FTC.s 0 Commentators, even before the settlement, had sug-
gested that the FTC's claim had been meritless. The New York Times,
a year and a half after the FTC filed its claim, wittily emphasized that
the answer to the FTC's suit could be found in the marketplace; proof
of the competitive behavior between Wild Oats and Whole Foods
could be shown in the depressed prices of Whole Foods products post-
merger consummation. 181 More recently, as of March 2009, it was re-
ported in the Wall Street Journal that "Whole Foods [had] seen its
profits battered by the economic recession and stiffer competition
from traditional food retailers like Safeway Inc. and Supervalu
Inc." 182 These negative ramifications only support the argument that
the appellate court should have at least devoted more rationale to its
holding regarding the consummation of the merger.
VI. CONCLUSION
The relaxed standard for FTC preliminary injunctions may be detri-
mental to the antitrust enforcement system as a whole. Whole Foods
is illustrative of the effect preliminary injunctions have on the adjudi-
cation of FTC claims; the ultimate settlement was deemed a victory
for the government. Also, the Whole Foods case is demonstrative of
the flaws of our dual enforcement system and the erroneous determi-
nation that consummated mergers may be remedied.
Although the split decision of Whole Foods leaves no citable opin-
ion of the court, as Judge Kavanaugh warned, the day a solid majority
may lower the bar for the FTC to obtain preliminary injunction to
block mergers does not seem too far off.'83 Indeed, there appears to
be an indication by judges in both the D.C. Circuit and the Eastern
179. Assaf, supra note 132, at 63.
180. FTC Consent Order, supra note 52.
181. See Wait. Why Is the F.T.C. After Whole Foods?, N.Y. TIMEs, December 13, 2008, at 1,
available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/wait-why-is-the-ftc-after-whole-foods/.
"Since the F.T.C. first challenged the merger in June 2007, Whole Foods has increasingly lost its
hold on the organic and natural foods marketplace. Larger competitors like Safeway and Kroger
have vastly expanded their store-brand offerings of natural and organic products, and they are
often cheaper than those at Whole Foods." Id.
182. Timothy W. Martin, Whole Foods to Sell 31 Stores in FTC Deal, WALL ST. J., March 7,
2009, at 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article-email/SB123634938198152983-IMyQjAxMDI
5MzA2NjMwNDY5Wj.html.
183. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1061, n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kava-
naugh, J., dissenting).
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District of Virginia that they view this lax standard to be the correct
interpretation.184
184. See Jones, supra note 3, at 7.

